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SUMMARY 
• The UK will need to negotiate more than 100 new 
trade agreements if it leaves the EU customs union.
• Negotiations with the WTO and the EU are the most 
pressing. If the UK does not manage to reset its place 
in the WTO before leaving the EU, this could lead to 
legal and diplomatic complexities and possible trade 
conflicts.
• Trade partners in regional and bilateral agreements 
may want to change the terms of their existing 
agreements; and the UK may wish to include services 
trade – which is of increasing importance to its 
commercial performance – in these arrangements.
• To reduce the negotiation load, the UK could opt for 
temporary ‘peace clauses’ to maintain existing terms 
of trade during negotiations.
• In view of the narrow base of domestic expertise in 
conducting trade negotiations, the UK will need to 
recruit and train a large body of new specialist staff; 
these negotiators will have to consult with domestic 
vested interests as well as negotiate with the European 
Commission and external governments.
• If the UK is to expose its markets to greater 
competition, it also needs to be ready to help 
potentially disadvantaged groups at home to adjust.
• To ease negotiations with third countries, joining 
existing (or intended) mega-regional agreements could 
be advantageous; however, doing so may also result in 
loss of sovereignty.
• The most immediate challenges the UK faces arise 
from its reduced negotiating power as a sole actor, 
the initial lack of personnel and training in trade 
negotiation, time pressure, and concerns that the EU 
will seek to play hardball in order to discourage other 
member states from leaving the union.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the challenges for the UK as it attempts 
to redefine and renegotiate its post-Brexit foreign trading 
relationships. It starts from the position that the UK faces an 
immediate strategic choice in its approach to trade policy: 
whether to remain in the EU customs union. A decision to 
remain part of the customs union would mean a minimum 
of change in the UK’s relationship with the EU 27 as far as 
goods trade is concerned. Under this arrangement, the UK 
would continue to apply the existing EU common external 
tariff (as set out in the EU’s commitments as a party to 
the WTO), as well as any preferences negotiated with third 
countries by the European Commission already and in the 
future. 
The key advantage of remaining in the customs union is that 
there would be no need to introduce rules of origin, which 
would require potentially expensive customs procedures. 
These could delay transit and reduce trade volumes. In the 
context of the stated ambition of those who campaigned to 
leave the EU of ‘taking back control’, the main disadvantage 
of remaining in the customs union is that the UK could not 
directly negotiate trade agreements with third countries, 
either in the WTO or bilaterally. That would remain in the 
hands of the European Commission.
Based not least on recent statements by the UK secretary 
of state for international trade and the prime minister on 
the margins of the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, in 
September 2016, such independence to set Britain’s trade 
policy in future is a key element in Theresa May’s assertion 
that ‘Brexit means Brexit’. This paper therefore makes the 
assumption that the UK will not, after leaving the EU, remain 
part of the customs union.
In this context, the paper examines the nature of such 
trade negotiations; the scale of the negotiating tasks 
confronting the UK; and potential approaches that may 
reduce the immediate negotiating load. It also identifies the 
countries that should be prioritized for trading negotiations, 
and examines the likely resources that will be required to 
undertake these.
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THE NATURE OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
The history of trade negotiations, whether multilateral, 
bilateral or regional, has been of one pursuing reciprocal 
market access. Each side aims to maximize access for its 
exporters while continuing to protect sensitive industries that 
are politically important but not internationally competitive. 
However, trade negotiations go beyond simply extracting 
concessions. More recent trade agreements have pursued 
deeper economic integration and cooperation, covering 
not only goods but also services and investment. Such 
arrangements have attempted to harmonize regulations and 
standards, as well as to facilitate free movement in a world in 
which markets are increasingly interconnected. The capacity 
to achieve asymmetrically favourable results – in essence the 
aim of all negotiators – depends on many factors, including 
economic size and significance, negotiating deftness and 
careful planning.
Major economic benefits from trade come from opening up 
domestic markets to imports. Lower prices, higher quality, 
newer products and technologies benefit consumers and 
producers alike, although further market opening also 
creates ‘losers’ and generates political resistance at home.
This means that trade negotiators have to negotiate with 
vested domestic interests as well as foreign governments. 
These two-level games, which have to be played out on 
both sides, contribute to the protracted nature of trade 
negotiations. If the UK is to expose its markets to more 
competition, it also needs to be ready to help potentially 
disadvantaged groups at home to adjust – drawing on tools 
such as delayed implementation in sensitive/declining 
sectors, retraining for workers whose jobs are lost, regional 
assistance to encourage new investment in areas hit hardest 
by increased import competition, and short- and long-
term compensation beyond standard social security. The 
agriculture sector is an important example in this respect.
THE SCALE OF THE NEGOTIATING 
CHALLENGE FOR THE UK
Annex 1 outlines the probable negotiations that the UK will 
be engaged in as a result of Brexit. As it demonstrates, 
the UK will need to engage with the remaining 163 WTO 
members (including the 27 EU member states). Beyond this, 
following the Directorate General for Trade of the European 
Commission’s (DG Trade) classification of bilateral and 
regional trade relationships, there are 148 potential sets of 
negotiations facing the UK.2  Of these, 92 are with countries 
in receipt of unilateral GSP preferences that the UK can 
continue after leaving the EU. Nonetheless, the sheer number 
2.  European Commission (2016), ‘Overview of FTA and Other Trade 
Negotiations’, last modified September 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf (accessed 20 
Sept. 2016). 
Leaving the customs union immediately opens a wide variety 
of negotiations. These include:
· Extracting a UK schedule of commitments in the WTO 
from the EU schedules, which currently include the UK, 
and resetting relations with the non-EU members of the 
multilateral trading system;
· Negotiating a new trading relationship with the EU 27;
· Agreeing trade deals (which may in effect mean no more 
than agreeing to continue with the status quo) with 
countries whose trade with the UK is currently covered by 
FTAs with the EU;
· Designing and agreeing the UK’s future trade relations 
with least developed countries and other developing 
countries covered by the EU’s Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP); 
· Ratifying the FTAs negotiated recently by the EU;1
· Pursuing separate trade agreements with countries and 
regional groups currently in negotiations with the EU on 
the terms of an FTA; and
· Pursuing trade agreements with countries with which the 
EU neither has nor is negotiating an agreement.
Annex 1, at the end of this paper, outlines these negotiations, 
including the countries involved, and offers some tentative 
assessment of offensive and defensive interests in each case. 
This list gives an idea of the scale (but not the complexity) of 
the potential tasks confronting the UK. Even rubber-stamping 
the continuation of existing agreements demands diplomatic 
and negotiating resources, and requires that trade partners 
have no demands for increased liberalization from the UK in 
light of its new status.
Another challenging aspect of negotiating a new set of 
external trade relations is the extent to which UK diplomacy 
will have to be engaged simultaneously on multiple levels. 
That said, the success of this venture will inevitably 
depend on the sequencing of diplomatic endeavours, with 
negotiations with the remaining EU members being the 
foundation.
In developing a trade strategy, the UK must immediately 
navigate the detail of specific agreements while striving 
to manage its strategic objectives. Ideally, it would use its 
withdrawal from the EU as an opportunity to rethink the basis 
of UK trade policy and pursue a UK-specific vision. Yet the 
workload and time pressure that Brexit commands suggest 
that deciding – let alone negotiating – a completely new 
regime is probably unrealistic. Thus this paper focuses on the 
more mundane question of what may be feasible.
1.  FTAs with Canada, Ukraine, Singapore and Vietnam may be 
ratified before the UK leaves the EU.
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REDUCING THE NEGOTIATING LOAD4
A reduced negotiating load can, initially at least, be achieved 
by minimizing change in any existing arrangements between 
the UK and its trading partners. The UK can pursue a 
temporary ‘peace clause’ with the EU to maintain existing 
terms of trade during negotiations establishing the future 
EU–UK trade relationship. For trading partners covered 
under the WTO, the UK could offer to apply existing (i.e. EU) 
terms subject only to reciprocity. For countries with EU FTAs 
and GSP provisions, the terms of these agreements would 
continue to apply subject to FTA members offering the UK the 
same terms as the EU 27. If FTA partners or the UK (notably 
in the field of services) wish to negotiate revisions, this could 
also be managed by the use of a ‘peace clause’ to guarantee 
an extension of EU terms for, say, five years, during which 
period a renegotiation of the UK’s terms could prepared and 
launched. The same could apply in the case of GSP. This 
approach would allow management of negotiating resources 
while providing continuity and certainty in the early years of 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In a worst-case scenario, 
this could simply kick the proverbial can down the road. 
Deployed carefully, however, it could allow the UK to design 
and deliver a distinctive trade policy fit for the 21st century.
PRIORITIZING TARGETS FOR NEGOTIATION
Negotiations with the WTO and the EU are the most important 
and the most pressing. Establishing these new relationships 
is crucial to resetting existing trade arrangements and 
exploring new trade opportunities elsewhere. The EU–UK 
trade relationship will shape the objectives of the rest of 
the world in trade with the UK. Moreover, it is hard to see 
how negotiations with third parties can conclude until after 
new arrangements with the WTO are in place. Only then can 
they be clear about the baseline from which to measure the 
value of any preferences in the UK market relative to WTO 
commitments and competitors from the EU.
It is possible for the UK to pursue simultaneous negotiations 
with the WTO and the EU, with the aim of establishing 
independent WTO status as quickly as possible by making 
minimal changes to its schedules of commitments. However, 
if the new relationship between the UK and the EU entails 
erecting significant trade barriers between the two, this will 
pose additional problems in the WTO, as partners may well 
object that their existing advantages under the WTO have 
been impaired by the split. The UK will be able to respond to 
this problem only as the terms of its new relationship with the 
EU take shape.
4. A maintained assumption by the authors is that the UK will no 
longer be a member of the customs union or the EU common 
customs area after Brexit.
of countries involved means that the undertaking will be 
significant even if negotiations are restricted to consultation 
procedures. And excluding these, the UK will still have to 
negotiate its long-term trading relationship with the EU and 
to undertake 56 potentially live sets of negotiations once it 
takes its place as a standalone member of the WTO. In play 
will be agreements the UK already has as a consequence 
of its EU membership, agreements being negotiated by the 
European Commission, and completely new agreements with 
major trading partners. As an indication, the Commission is 
currently engaged in 10 active sets of trade negotiations.
However, such numbers are not the only measure of scale; 
intensity also matters. It is one thing to agree to continue 
existing arrangements, but quite another to contemplate 
changes to those agreements. Two issues may trigger 
demand for change. First, trade partners may want to 
change the terms of their agreements, since the UK currently 
represents around 15 per cent of the EU 28 market size 
overall. Desire for change will be more likely if the eventual 
EU–UK agreement introduces rules of origin that prevent 
trading partners taking advantage of the UK as a point of 
entry to the whole of the EU (or vice versa).
Second, for the UK, the increasing importance of services 
trade to its commercial performance, and generally in world 
trade terms, suggests that services should be included in 
bilateral and regional agreements as a priority. There may be 
pressure from developing country partners to include aspects 
of services trade, notably Mode 4; and from developed 
country partners to break new ground by providing rights of 
establishment for foreign services providers. Given the highly 
emotive debate surrounding immigration prior to the June 
2016 referendum, increased imports of Mode 4 services is 
likely to be a hard sell at home.3
Services trade liberalization is also more difficult as it 
can entail conflict with domestic public policy objectives 
(especially in health and education). Yet services are the area 
in which the UK specializes. Focusing on goods alone would 
divert attention away from the largest barriers to UK trade 
and its most dynamic growth area. It would also risk serious 
damage to the core of the UK economy by encouraging 
the flight of service providers. There is thus a premium on 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the UK 
and its trade partners in services, thus enabling meaningful 
negotiations in this area.
3.  See McGuire, S. (2016), ‘What does an inclusive UK trade policy 
look like?’, UKTPO blog 2016, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/eu/articles/uk-
trade-policy (accessed 20 Sept. 2016).
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the Union’. This seems to include the possibility of trade 
negotiations taking place in parallel to, or as part of, 
Article 50 negotiations. Nevertheless, the justification for 
proceeding immediately hangs on the slender hook of treaty 
interpretation, and the EU 27 may refuse to cooperate in 
this respect. Ideally – as already noted – there would be 
a ‘peace clause’ with the EU that allows trade to continue 
based on existing procedures while the long-term agreement 
is negotiated in full (but presumably with added rules of origin 
as the UK will have exited the customs union).
THIRD-COUNTRY NEGOTIATIONS: SETTING 
PRIORITIES
A strict interpretation of EU treaty obligations also suggests 
that UK negotiations with third countries cannot begin until 
after the UK has left the EU. The latter may put diplomatic 
pressure on trading partners not to jump the gun with the UK 
even informally, although signs like the UK’s recent talks with 
Australia suggest that UK commercial diplomacy is already 
under way.
That said, there are already around 20 potential new UK 
FTAs. These include FTAs with China, India, Brazil and various 
ASEAN members, among rapidly growing emerging markets, 
as well as the USA, Australia and New Zealand among slower 
growing developed economies. The criteria for selecting 
which FTAs to prioritize include the size and diversity of 
markets of potential partners, size of barriers to trade and 
investment, growth of domestic demand in areas of British 
competitiveness, and complementarities with UK economic 
structures (i.e. products that could fit with bilateral supply 
chains).
Negotiating agreements with English-speaking countries, 
and/or where the legal system and trade objectives are 
broadly similar – so there are likely to be fewer opportunities 
for misunderstandings and mistakes – is attractive. 
The Commonwealth is one potential source of priority 
partnerships, as recent preliminary discussions between 
the UK and Australia underline. Another option for ease of 
negotiation is applying to join an existing mega-regional 
agreement – most notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
subject to its being ratified and implemented by the US. The 
upside of TPP is having an FTA with 12 countries, including 
the US, Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia 
and Vietnam, that are all likely targets under an independent 
UK trade policy. In reality, however, negotiation in this 
instance would mean turning up for the signing ceremony, 
not influencing terms. It is unlikely that any member would be 
interested in recasting an agreement that took more than five 
years to craft for the sake of UK membership.
Joining the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) – should this get to the point of signature or 
implementation – is another possible approach to reducing 
the burden of negotiations. Like TPP, however, TTIP would for 
the UK likely be a case of ‘take it or leave it’. Nonetheless, 
Subject to negotiations within the WTO and with the EU 
running smoothly, and ‘peace clauses’ allowing existing EU 
FTAs and GSP to be dealt with over a longer time frame, 
attention can be turned to how to prioritize and negotiate new 
FTAs.
THE WTO
Resetting the UK’s place in the WTO is crucial. If the UK does 
not manage to achieve this before it leaves the EU, it could 
emerge in an ambiguous position despite applying exactly 
the same tariffs and customs procedures, potentially opening 
the door to legal and diplomatic complexities and possible 
trade conflicts.5 Preventing such an outcome will require 
rapid and active diplomacy with partners in the EU and in the 
WTO. In the latter, it may be to the UK’s advantage to co-opt 
a sympathetic WTO ambassador to set up a discreet ‘friends 
of the UK’ group to smooth its path through what could be a 
difficult few years. The EU should also want to help regularize 
the UK’s schedules. Brexit also potentially opens the EU to 
demands from WTO members to renegotiate EU schedules, 
so there is a shared interest in re-establishing these as 
quickly as possible.
THE EU
As the UK’s biggest export market and largest supplier, the EU 
is the most important concern for the immediate future of UK 
trade performance. Whatever future relationship the UK has 
with the EU 27 (short of remaining in the customs union) will 
result in lower volumes of trade than the status quo. Leaving 
the customs union will mean that the closest relationship the 
UK could have is a free-trade area. This would entail rules of 
origin and the introduction of new barriers in EU–UK trade in 
goods (in particular) even if full access to the single market 
remains.
The key objective should be to begin discussions on the 
future trade relations as soon as possible. However, a strict 
interpretation of EU treaty obligations suggests that these 
negotiations cannot begin until after the UK leaves the union. 
That said, the content of Article 50 negotiations and the role 
of trade negotiations in the exit process are ambiguous.6 
Article 50(2) states that an exit agreement should take 
‘account of the framework for its future relationship with 
5.  See UK Trade Policy Observatory (2016), ‘The World Trade 
Organisation: A Safety Net For A Post-Brexit UK Trade Policy?’, 
Briefing Paper 1, July 2016, https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/
gateway/file.php?name=briefing-paper-1.pdf&site=18 (accessed 20 
Sept. 2016).
6. See Lydgate, E. (2016), ‘Delaying EU-UK trade negotiations would 
cost billions – in the best-case scenario’, UKTPO blog 2016, http://
www.sussex.ac.uk/eu/articles/brexit-delay (accessed 20 Sept. 2016).
THE  UK  TRADE  LANDSCAPE  AF TER  BREX I T
5
to negotiate or actively manage. The assumed size of the 
European Commission’s own body of negotiators suggests 
that the UK could need twice as many on its own side – 
i.e. 700 negotiation-capable staff. Given shorter lines of 
communication within the UK it may be possible to work from 
a leaner basis, but for the UK it will be anything but ‘business 
as usual’ after Brexit. The need to engage with a large, high-
stakes and high-tempo agenda implies that a competent body 
of 700 may not be excessive.
To meet this need, the UK must recruit and train dozens 
of trade negotiators from within Whitehall. Accessing 
experienced staff will require a call to service to former UK 
trade policy officials – including those who have worked at 
the European Commission; former trade officials from non-
EU countries – e.g. Hong Kong, Australia, Canada or New 
Zealand – all potentially subject to conflicts of interest; UK 
and foreign academics with expertise in trade policy and law; 
personnel drawn from the UK and foreign private sector with 
experience in trade associations, legal practice, supply chain 
management; and UK and foreign NGO staffers with trade 
experience.
signing TTIP could, at a stroke, be a way of doing a better 
deal than being accorded most-favoured-nation (MFN) status 
with the US and a new deal with the EU.
Of course, utilizing TTIP as a trade framework with the EU 
would result in a pale imitation of the market access that 
the UK would receive if it remains in the single market. Also, 
since TPP and TTIP have significant regulatory provisions, they 
may also result in loss of sovereignty and thus likely public 
opposition.
With a smaller market, the UK will not have as strong a 
negotiating position as it has had as part of the EU, but the 
EU will face a similar problem in the absence of the UK, and 
thus there may be a common interest in facilitating solutions. 
NEGOTIATING RESOURCES
Much is made of the lack of UK trade negotiation capability. 
Beyond the UK nationals working for DG Trade in Brussels (32 
at February 2016), there is little, if any, front-line experience 
of negotiating specific trade agreements. There is, however, 
experience of negotiating on EU trade agreements in the UK 
Department for International Trade, as well as negotiating 
experience in the Department for International Development, 
the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 
(concerning agriculture and, increasingly, the trade aspects of 
environmental policy), the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (of 
lobbying worldwide) and the Treasury. Negotiation is a major 
part of what civil servants do, whether with other government 
departments, the European Commission and other EU 
member states, or with international groups on topics such 
as climate change. While the practice of negotiation in this 
specific context is not dissimilar, what the UK is currently 
missing is a large enough group of able people familiar 
with the language and practice of trade law, policy and 
negotiations, and their potential economic and social impact.
How big is such a negotiating apparatus likely to be? Since 
the UK will in essence be taking on the same trade policy 
task as DG Trade, that may be the place to begin. DG 
Trade (which excludes agriculture) has just under 700 staff 
members. Taking into account agriculture and embassy 
officials suggests that the EU trade policy team could number 
1,000–1,200 staff. The European Commission has 42 
policy units in trade and agriculture directorates dealing with 
trade, each with a head, a deputy head and a team of policy 
officers.7 Assuming there are six policy desks, and allowing for 
10 directors, there could be up to 350 front-line negotiators.
The UK could have 20 or more new agreements to 
consider, and a much larger set of existing relationships 
7. All these figures come from European  Commission (2016), 
Statistical Bulletin on 01/02/2016,
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/europa_sp2_bs_dist_staff_
en.pdf (accessed on 20 Sept. 2016).
CONCLUSION
The post-Brexit negotiating terrain is thus varied and 
complex. The most immediate challenges confronting the 
UK as a sole actor result from its reduced negotiating power, 
from the relative lack of experienced personnel and training 
in front-line trade negotiation, from time pressures, and 
from concerns that the EU will seek to play hardball with the 
UK to discourage other member states from opting to leave 
the union.
For the UK, granting concessions or adopting EU trading 
terms, and so maintaining the status quo as far as possible, 
will ease its transition out of the union. Yet privileging 
ease of transition could be detrimental to the UK’s longer-
term goals. This does not mean that opportunities are 
absent. The UK can pursue better deals for strategically 
important sectors, with the aim of benefiting businesses, 
investors and economic growth. Its trade strategy must be 
calibrated to its economic strength, and there must be a 
careful assessment of national priorities. Negotiators will 
inevitably need to make trade-offs between core strategic 
objectives. Care must also be taken to ensure that the UK 
government considers the ramifications for all stakeholders. 
This includes effects on workers and industries, as well 
as the environment and human rights that result from the 
withdrawal from the EU and the eventual replacement of the 
UK’s current trade arrangements.
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Country/group Negotiating partners UK defensive interests UK offensive interests
Extracting UK from 
WTO schedules 
European Commission + 27 
member states
Retain access to markets currently covered by EU 
FTAs.
To do this as part of Article 
50 negotiations.
Agreeing schedules 
with rest of WTO 
members
164 less EU 27 + European 
Commission may be 
allies in this since some 
EU schedules should be 
updated 
Depends on whether UK wishes to increase 
any barriers above levels in EU schedules (e.g. 
agriculture). To do this with minimum disruption for 
other WTO member states. There is a possibility for 
some unilateral liberalization, carefully targeted to 
reduce any opposition to adoption of UK schedule.
GPA, GATS/services.
Take independent 
seat in Trade in 
Services Agreement 
(TiSA), a plurilateral 
WTO negotiation in 
Geneva
23 WTO members including 
European Commission
The size and global competitiveness of the UK 
services sector. There may be few defensive 
interests, but in light of the resistance to TTIP on 
the grounds of protecting public policy and public 
services, protecting the NHS and other public 
services may be one. 
To maximize other members’ 
liberalization commitments 
from the base of existing 
GATS agreement.
EU 27 European Commission +27 
member states
This market includes 54% of UK imports of goods 
and services in 2015. ‘Brexit means Brexit’, and 
at a maximum: no free movement of labour; no 
mandatory budgetary obligations; not directly subject 
to EU law; and no restrictive rules of origin to reduce 
opportunities for the UK to be members of EU-based 
supply chains.
This market covers 44% of UK 
exports of goods and services 
in 2015.
Maximum possible single 
market access and special 
reference to financial 
services.
Existing EU customs 
unions: Turkey will 
have to negotiate 
access to the UK 
market
Turkey, San Marino and 
Andorra (Monaco?)
Turkey will not get automatic access to the UK 
market on same terms as the EU 27. For security 
policy reasons, the UK may want to allow Turkey the 
same access terms as the EU 27. 
The UK will automatically 
get the same terms with 
these countries as with EU 
27 because they are in a 
customs union with the EU.
Existing EU FTAs 
with third countries
55 countries; EPAs with 
individual states of the 
African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries, and FTAs 
in Asia and Latin America as 
well as regional agreements 
in the Caribbean and in 
central America
None, unless UK interest groups demand an 
increase in protection.
Approximately 6% of UK 
exports of goods. 
To ensure a through train 
from existing FTA to a purely 
bilateral FTA.
EU FTAs waiting on 
ratification
4 (Vietnam, Singapore, 
Ukraine and Canada)
None, unless UK interest groups demand an 
increase in protection. 
To ensure a through train 
from existing FTA to a purely 
bilateral FTA.
EU ‘Everything 
But Arms’ (EBA) 
arrangement
49 least developed 
countries
Perhaps in clothing and footwear? To ensure a through train 
from existing arrangements to 
purely bilateral arrangements. 
GSP 30 countries
GSP+ 13 countries
FTA negotiations 
under way by EU 
while UK still a 
member
US, India, Japan, Malaysia, 
Philippines; regional 
Economic Partnership 
Agreements (West Africa, 
East Africa, Southern 
Africa, Pacific); Mercosur 
(5 core members, but up 
to 12 including associate 
members and observers); 
GCC (up to 12 members)
Negotiations effectively 
suspended
To ensure EU negotiations do not pre-empt potential 
UK bilateral deals.
Do FTA/TTIP equivalent to 
the US.
An ambitious FTA with India 
and Japan.
EU bilateral 
investment treaties 
in negotiation 
China, Myanmar May be corporate governance issues in case of 
Chinese FDI.
Mode 3 services requiring 
rights of establishment.
Protection of IP.
Effective dispute settlement.
ANNEX 1: TRADE POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE UK
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ANNEX 2: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Article 50 Under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, a member state can notify the EU of its 
withdrawal. The EU must negotiate a ‘withdrawal agreement’ with that state.
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Customs union A trade bloc in which there are no tariff barriers among the member states; there is a 
common external tariff against the rest of the world.
DG Trade Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission.
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Trade and development agreements negotiated between the EU and African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries.
Free-trade agreement (FTA) An agreement among two or more countries to reduce barriers to trade, with a view to 
increasing the volume and value of commerce between them.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade The precursor to the WTO, and a limited agreement governing international trade in goods.
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) A non-reciprocal preferential tariff system granted to developing countries by certain 
developed countries.
GSP + EU GSP programme that removes tariffs for developing countries in exchange for adopting 
international conventions on human and labour rights, environment and good governance.
Mercosur Sub-regional trade bloc of South American countries.
MFN (most-favoured nation) Agreed level of tariffs extended by one country to all trade partners in the WTO.
Mode 4 of services trade delivery Services transactions delivered by the temporary movement of workers from the exporting 
countries to the importing countries. Can cover highly skilled workers, e.g. IT staff sent abroad 
to install new systems as well as low-skilled workers, e.g. seasonal workers for agriculture.
Rules of origin Administrative procedures required in FTA and other preferential trading arrangements to 
determine whether products crossing borders qualify for preferential treatment.
Tariffs Taxes on imports or exports most frequently levied as a fixed percentage of the total value of a 
consignment, but less frequently as a fixed sum (e.g. £x per unit or per ton).
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade and investment agreement among 12 Pacific Rim countries, currently awaiting 
ratification.
Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) 
Trade and investment agreement currently being negotiated between the US and the EU.
World Trade Organization (WTO) An intergovernmental organization of 164 members, designed to govern global trade.
THE  UK  TRADE  LANDSCAPE  AF TER  BREX I T
FURTHER INFORMATION
This document was written by Emily Lydgate, Jim Rollo 
and Rorden Wilkinson, with inputs from other members of 
the UKTPO. The UK Trade Policy observatory (UKTPO), a 
partnership between the University of Sussex and Chatham 
House, is an independent expert group that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade policy 
proposals for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and other 
interested parties through tailored training packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide variety of 
stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s international trading 
environment is reconstructed in a manner that benefits all 
in Britain and is fair to Britain, the EU and the world. The 
Observatory offers a wide range of expertise and services 
to help support government departments, international 
organisations and businesses to strategise and develop new 
trade policies in the post-Brexit era.
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